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Since 1990, a number of welfare regimes in 
remarkably different parts of the world have 
developed surprisingly similar policy reforms. In 
Canada and Australia, for example, the idea of 
“investing in children” has been played out in a 
proliferation of social policies and programs aimed at 
early childhood education and care (ECEC) and 
support for families with children; and in Japan and 
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South Korea, the idea of “productive welfare” has 
manifested in noticeable expansions of public 
provisions in child care, elderly care, and support 
programs for working parents. In all these countries 
new social policies are emphasizing children, women, 
and family, a policy sector that, unlike pension and 
health care, has been hitherto low on the 
government’s policy priority list, traditionally 
considered a private matter rather than public policy 
concern. Indeed, as an indication of how much policy 
thinking has changed, in all these countries 
governments are now claiming that investing in 
children, women, and family is not only socially 
important, but that it is good for the country and the 
economy.  
This paper compares the two Anglo-Saxon liberal 
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This paper compares the social investment policy reforms that have been introduced by the two Anglo-Saxon 
liberal welfare regimes of Canada and Australia and the two East Asian welfare regimes of Japan and South 
Korea since the 1990s. The paper examines the causes of these social policy changes, and asks why these 
seemingly different contexts produce such similar policy idea. While all four countries share similar broad 
ideational template and language of social investment, they differ in terms of their target groups and policy 
instruments. Whereas Canada and Australia have focused their social investment policies on children through 
ECEC (what I call an “invest in the future” model); Japan and South Korea have approached social investment 
from a more general human capital and economic activation perspective (what I call a “human capital 
activation” model). As a result, social investment policies in these countries have targeted more broadly on 
children, women, and the elderly. I argue that these differences in social investment approaches stem from the 
differences in their social, political and economic contexts, and the political economic legacies.  
 





welfare regimes of Canada and Australia and the two 
East Asian welfare regimes of Japan and South Korea 
to understand the significance of this apparent 
convergence in social policy ideas. I ask whether these 
observations of similar social policy reforms 
demonstrate a mere coincidence or a new and more 
universal public policy trajectory. The paper 
examines the causes of these social policy changes, 
and asks why these seemingly different contexts 
produce such similar policy idea. The first section of 
the paper briefly discusses recent literature on social 
investment policies. The second section maps out the 
nature and the extent of new social investment policy 
reforms in the four countries since 1990, and how 
they are implemented. I argue that while all four 
countries share similar broad ideational template and 
language of social investment, they differ in terms of 
their target groups and policy instruments. Indeed, 
whereas Canada and Australia have focused its social 
investment policies primarily on children through 
ECEC (what I call an “invest in the future” model); 
Japan and South Korea have approached social 
investment from a more general human capital and 
economic activation perspective (what I call a 
“human capital activation” model). As a result, social 
investment policies in these countries have targeted 
more broadly on children, women, and the elderly. 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the two 
approaches to social investment. 
 
 
Social Investment – Literature and Debates 
 
In the 1980s and the 90s, most developed and 
developing countries adopted neoliberal market-
based policy reforms in response to global economic 
crises, and to conservative critiques of the post-war 
Keynesian redistributive welfare state. Through 
spending cuts, welfare state retrenchments, and 
privatization of public services, neoliberal reforms 
were successful in unloading public services to the 
private sector and the community. In many 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America, 
neoliberal reforms were also conditioned as a part of 
the financial rescue or assistance from such 
international organizations as International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). While effective in 
solving some of the government fiscal concerns, these 
reforms also created new social problems. In many 
countries, they resulted in increased poverty, social 
and economic inequality, and human insecurity. 
Against this global policy backdrop, social investment 
perspective emerged in the late-1990s as a re-
calibration of the neoliberal policy framework that 
dominated public policy thinking after the 1970s 
(Jenson & St-Martin, 2003; Jenson, 2010; Midgley, 1995, 
1999; Midgley & Tang, 2001; Peng, in press, a; Perkins, 
Nelms & Symth, 2004).  
Generally, the social investment perspective 
encompasses three core ideas: 1) re-integration of 
social and economic policies; 2) a shift from 
redistributive state to facilitative state; and 3) 
economic activation through human capital 
investment. The social investment perspective tries to 
ameliorate the failure of the neoliberal policy 
approach of the 1980s and the early 90s by 
acknowledging the limits of free-market solution, and 
by attempting to re-integrate social and economic 
policies. By incorporating social policy agenda, such 
as investment in children, family, education and 
health, with economic policy concerns such as global 
economic competition, shifting industrial structures, 
and job and wealth creation, social investment 
perspective reasserts the importance of the public 
policy in correcting market failures and in achieving 
positive economic returns at the same time. As 
Giddens (1998) points out in The Third Way: the 
Renewal of Social Democracy, by investing in human 
capital, “social investment state” can maintain social 
and economic well-being of the community and 
society. Under the New Labour government in the 
UK, social investment was perceived as moving 
beyond traditional “passive” welfare state focused 
on income maintenance to creating economic 
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opportunities and prospects through targeted 
investment in human capital. The New Labour’s 
conceptual framework towards social investment has 
been adopted by countries not only in the English 
speaking world, but also in East Asia, including Japan 
and South Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung government 
(1998-2003) in South Korea, for example, has explicitly 
adopted the New Labour’s social investment 
framework and language in its “productive welfare” 
agenda since the end of the 1990s (Korea Office of the 
President, 2000).  
The re-integration of social policies with economic 
policies (a position that had been hitherto rejected by 
the neoliberal approach), however, does not mean the 
return to the Keynesian model of welfare states. 
Rather, the social investment approach focuses on the 
functional complement between welfare and market, 
the public and the private. The state is thus seen as 
moving beyond its redistributive role by taking 
increasingly facilitative role to enhance individual 
capabilities and opportunities. Such languages as 
“capacity building”, “lowering the ‘welfare wall’” 
and “creating virtuous economic circle” through 
social investment are frequently used to describe the 
new pro-active role of the state in facilitating and 
promoting individual potential and linking them to 
the labour market. To achieve this, social investment 
policies thus focus on investments in human and 
social capital development. The early child education 
and care (ECEC) is a common policy instrument used 
to achieve social investment, but other policy tools 
such as life-long education, skills training, job creation 
and labour market activation through public-private 
partnerships and voluntary sector development are 
also introduced by different governments to facilitate 
economic growth and development. Rather than 
passively supporting individuals and families 
through welfare, the new role of the state is therefore 
to be actively connecting individuals to the labour 
market, and to facilitate individuals to transit from 
welfare to work.  
 
The Shift towards the Social Investment in 
Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea 
 
The Social Investment Idea 
The governments in all the four countries examined 
in this paper – Canada, Australia, Japan and South 
Korea – have adopted the idea and the language of 
the social investment since the 1990s. In Canada, the 
social investment idea was publicly articulated by the 
federal Liberal government through the Throne 
Speech at the beginning of the Parliamentary Session 
in 1997. Over the next decade, the social investment 
discourses developed at both federal and provincial 
levels. The emergence of the social investment 
approach in Canada can be observed by the various 
policy experimentations at different levels of 
governments. These include the highly successful 
implementation of the $5-a-day child care program in 
Quebec, the introduction of the Canada Child Tax 
Benefit in 1998 extending financial support to low 
income families with dependent children, and which 
expanded over the next decade, and the failed federal 
attempt to develop a national day care strategy in 
2004. Despite the local and provincial variations, 
observers argue that the social investment perspective 
in Canada gradually led to a redesigning of “welfare 
architecture” over the next decade and a half as ideas 
and slogans such as “invest in children” became 
mainstreamed and social policies became increasingly 
oriented towards early education and learning and 
other forms of skills and human capital development 
(Jenson & St-Martin, 2003; Jenson, 2010).  
In Australia, the idea of social investment approach 
also began to emerge towards the end of the 1990s. At 
the federal level, policy approach towards the family 
begun to shift, from tightening the eligibility for 
family allowance (for example, Basic Family Payment 
– 1992) and supporting stay-at-home mothers to care 
for their children (e.g. Home Child-care Allowance – 
1994 and Parenting Allowance – 1995) to increasingly 
supporting families with the cost of child care and 
shifting child care from social welfare to economic 
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mainstream. At the same time, the federal 
Commonwealth government also saw opportunities 
for the private sector to expand into child care service 
market, which had been dominated by public and 
not-for-profit sector providers. During the 
Commonwealth Coalition government (1996-2007) 
child care fee subsidies for parents expanded rapidly, 
while at the same time the government successively 
removed the barriers to the for-profit child care 
providers to operate, and facilitated the expansion of 
the for-profit child care along with the public and not-
for-profit child care sector (Brennan, 2002,  2007). 
Commonwealth states, such as Victoria, also took 
initiatives to introduce social investment policies. For 
example, there was a significant expansion in the state 
support for education, health and other social and 
community services under Bracks government, as 
evidenced by dramatic increase in public spending in 
these areas throughout the early 2000s (Perkins, Nelm, 
& Smyth, 2004). Like the province of Quebec in 
Canada, Victoria’s child care policy reform, based on 
the social investment idea, also became an exemplary 
case of proactive social investment strategy in 
Australia. 
Although the Japanese government never explicitly 
articulated the idea of social investment, there has 
been a decisive shift in the government policies 
towards social investment after 1994. Following the 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party’s electoral 
defeat in 1993 that ended the party’s 38-year majority 
rule, and the beginning of the coalition politics for the 
next decade and a half, Japanese government made a 
turn around in its social policy positions by ending 
the process of welfare retrenchment that had been 
taking place since the mid-1980s and committing to 
welfare expansion (Peng, 2002). Faced with the 
collapse of the bubble economy, the imperatives of 
population ageing and low fertility and the volatile 
coalition politics, the national government undertook 
a series of administrative and social security reforms 
over the next decade, including the introduction of 
the Angel Plan in 1994, which led to significantly 
expansion child care and support for families with 
dependent children (Peng, 2002). Reversing its earlier 
rhetoric of supporting the “traditional role of the 
family”, the Angel Plan openly admitted the limit of 
the family’s capacity to provide care, and the 
importance of supporting the family by reducing its 
care burden (MOHLW, 1997). By providing social 
support to the family – such as child care, parental 
leave and other family support, social policy reforms 
also attempt to incentivize young couples to have 
more children. The Angel Plan was later 
complemented by the introduction of the Long-term 
Care Insurance in 1997 (implemented after 2000) 
universalizing the care for the elderly. Since the mid-
1990s, Japanese government’s social care expenditure 
on both child care and elderly care multiplied steadily 
(Abe, 2009). Building on its campaign slogan, 
“moving from concrete to people”, the recently 
elected Democratic Party policy platform appears to 
converge even more with the social investment 
orientation. In sum, despite the lack of explicit public 
policy discourse on social investment, the Japanese 
government’s policy orientation since the mid-1990s, 
particularly in relation to social care, signals a break 
from its earlier neo-liberal approach to social welfare, 
and amounts to de facto social investment policy 
reforms.  
Finally, in South Korea, the idea of social 
investment became the core principle of the Kim Dae-
Jung’s administration’s “productive welfare 
paradigm” after 1998 (Korea Office of the President, 
2000). Since 1998, social security system in Korea has 
been overhauled and expanded, including the 
universalization of health and pension insurance, the 
extension of employment and occupational insurance, 
and the reform of the National Basic Security system. 
It has been suggested that productive welfare such as 
the one proposed by Kim Dae-Jung is simply a 
revamping of the productivist welfare regime often 
found in developmental states in East Asia (Holliday, 
2000). Midgley (1995, 1999), for example, points out 
that developmental or productivist welfare regime is 
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inherently social investment oriented because of the 
regime’s fundamental economic development 
objectives. While the post-1998 productive welfare in 
Korea may appear as a reconfiguration of the 
developmental state policies, it is nevertheless a 
significant departure from the welfare policy 
approach taken by previous political regimes. Until 
1998, welfare regime in South Korea was 
unquestionably productive and lean. The state’s 
social investment was therefore limited to very 
narrow sectors and the public provisions for social 
welfare, child care and elder care were almost non-
existent. The welfare state expansion in the 1990s, and 
in particular the social care and social welfare 
expansions after 1998, marks a noticeable broadening 
and mainstreaming of the social investment idea 
unparallel compared to the previous period. 
Like Japan, public and policy anxiety over the rapid 
ageing and very low fertility in Korea in the recent 
years has also had an important impact on the Korean 
government’s thinking about the social investment. 
Social investment policies became even more explicit 
under the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-08) 
after 2003. This has resulted in rapid expansion of 
ECEC since 2003 and the introduction of Long-term 
Care Insurance for the elderly in 2008. Building onto 
the idea of social investment and productive welfare, 
the current conservative government, led by Lee 
Myung-bat (2008-present), has redoubled its 
commitment to social welfare expansion, contrary to 
the initially fear that the new government would cut 
social spending and reverse welfare expansion. Much 
emphasis has been made of the job creation potential 
of social care and social welfare expansion. In Korea, 
the investment in social welfare is increasingly seen as 
a positive economic proposition as social care 
expansion is closely interlocked with expansion of 
service industries, job creation, employment 
opportunities for women, and economic activation 
(Peng, 2010; in press, a).  
 
 
The Two Emerging of Social Investment Models 
The above overview of social investment ideas 
shows that Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea 
have all been charting a similar policy trajectory of 
adopting social investment discourse, language, and 
policies since the 1990s. The recent social policy 
reforms in these countries reveal that they are 
bringing social policies more closely in alignment 
with economic policy objectives, if not further 
integrating social and economic policies. Indeed, all 
four countries have seen a shift towards more 
instrumental use of social policy for economic ends. 
For instance, all these countries have strengthened 
their policy emphases on the ECEC. In all cases, child 
care is seen increasingly as beyond family 
responsibility, and more a part of a broader early 
child care and education system. At the same time, 
the ECEC is also increasingly viewed as an effective 
social investment policy tool to address issues 
ranging from child poverty, to meeting global 
economic competition, to the changes in the country’s 
economic base from manufacturing to knowledge-
based industries. Not surprisingly public spending on 
ECEC has increased substantially in all four countries, 
and there is a growing trend towards more closely 
coupling early child care with early child education.   
One reason for the convergence towards social 
investment ideas is the increased cross-national policy 
learning and the active policy dissemination by 
international organizations such as OECD, World 
Bank, IMF and the UN. Studies show that policy 
epistemic communities and policy networks are 
important conduits of policy learning and policy 
transfer, and there has been significant transnational 
movement of social policy ideas as policy makers and 
other actors become more globally mobile, and 
communication technology improve (Haas, 1992; 
Hulme, 2006; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In 
recent years, international organizations have begun 
to play increasingly active role within social policy 
epistemic communities. For example, as a “purveyor 
of ideas,” international organizations such as the 
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OECD and UNESCO have come to play a meditative 
role not only in policy innovation, translation and 
dissemination, but also, in setting international policy 
norms by identifying problems and providing a range 
of “best practice” solutions (Mahon & McBride, 2008; 
Peng, in press, b; Jenson, 2010). In particular, through 
policy documents and data sets such as Babies and 
Bosses and Starting Strong series and the OECD family 
database, OECD has effectively established family 
policy agenda and benchmarks for member countries 
to harmonize their social policies. The intensification 
of global social policy discourses on ECEC and social 
investment ideas are therefore an outcome of the 
global policy harmonization effect of international 
organizations and international NGOs. 
Having said that Canada, Australia, Japan and 
South Korea have all adopted the social investment 
idea, however, does not mean that they are 
implementing these policies in lock step with each 
other. In fact, despite the similarities in their social 
investment objectives and languages, there are some 
important differences in how social investment is 
actually understood and translated into policy 
reforms amongst the four countries. Broadly social 
investment policy reforms in Canada, Australia, 
Japan and South Korea can be grouped into types: 1) 
the “invest in the future” approach more commonly 
taken by Canada and Australia; and 2) the “human 
capital activation and mobilization” approach more 
widely used in Japan and South Korea. The 
differences in these social investment approaches 
stems from the differences in how the two groups of 
countries define social investment, and thus the 
choice of their policy instruments. How these 
countries define social investment is, in turn, closely 
related to their social economic contexts. 
 
Canada and Australia: invest in the future 
The social investment approaches in both Canada 
and Australia are explicitly future oriented. The tow 
countries have put their primary focus on children, 
the future generation. In both countries, the social 
investment ideas emerged from two policy concerns 
in the late 1990s: the rising child poverty, and the 
need to prepare the countries for the knowledge-
based economy. The proportion of children living in 
poverty in Canada and Australia rose in the 1980s 
and 90s, as a result of economic restructuring, welfare 
state cuts, and changes in family structure, 
particularly the substantial increase in single parent 
families. During the 1980s and 90s, both countries 
experienced rapid process of deindustrialization as 
their economic bases shifted from manufacturing to 
services and knowledge-based industries. One of the 
most visible outcomes of this shift to “new economy” 
was the change in the labour demand. The demand 
for skilled workers in new industries pushed the 
wages of educated and skilled labour force up while 
leaving the unskilled workers behind. The post-
secondary education attainment rate of younger 
people increased during this time, but this did not 
erase the fact that a significant proportion of adult 
population in these countries did not have the skills 
to succeed in the new economic context. The earnings 
gap became increasingly more evident in the 1990s as 
the earnings of the lower-wage workers (particularly 
male wages) fell while that of the higher-wage 
workers rose (Morisset, Myles, & Picot, 1994; Heisz, 
Jackson, & picot, 2004, Borland, 1999). The economic 
recession of the early 1990s further underscored the 
increasing social and economic inequalities of the 
new economy. In both countries, the “jobless 
economic recovery” left unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers further behind, contributing to the ever-
growing economic polarization.  
At the same time the family structures in the two 
countries also begun to change as extra-marital 
childbearing became more common, and common-
law relationships became more mainstream. The 
proportion of single parent families in Canada and 
Australia rose substantially over the 1980s and 90s. In 
Canada the proportion of single parent families as a 
percentage of families with dependent children rose 
from 16.6% in 1981 to 25% in 2001; in Australia, the 
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proportion increased from 14% in 1986-88 to 23% in 
2002-04.1 Studies show that in both countries over 
80% of these families are headed by mothers, and the 
majority of these families are poor and dependent on 
social assistance (Wong, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 
1993). In both countries, the high poverty rate 
amongst single parent families became an 
increasingly important public policy concern in the 
1990s. This situation was made worse by social 
welfare reforms at this time. In both countries, 
welfare state restructurings at federal and provincial 
levels resulted in the tightening of income support 
eligibility criteria, increased maternal employment 
expectations, and stricter means testing. The 
combination of the increase in the proportion of 
single parent families, welfare restructuring, and the 
increased labour market insecurity thus contributed 
to the increased child poverty rate. By the early 1990s, 
child poverty rates in Australia and Canada were 
14.0% and 13.5%, respectively, amongst the highest in 
the rich OECD nations (Rainwater & Smeeding, 2003). 
In response to the increase in single parent families, 
social welfare policies in these countries also shifted 
from supporting mothers with small children through 
welfare to increasingly conditioning mothers to work 
and “making fathers pay”. New work requirement 
for single mothers were introduced in both countries 
as a condition for income support, while stronger 
enforcement was put in place to ensure non-residing 
parent pay child support.   
Coming out this social and economic backdrop, 
social investment policies in Canada and Australia 
were therefore targeted to what were perceived as the 
new social risk groups, children, single parent 
families and low income families. Like the UK the 
social investment languages and discourses in 
Canada and Australia also emphasized the need to 
move from passive welfare to active economy. Terms 
such as “welfare-to-work” became a common 
expression for the new welfare regime. Increasingly, 
investing in children, particularly through early child 
education and care, were thought to be an effective 
tool to combating child poverty and creating 
conditions for future success. In both countries, ECEC 
initiatives such as Best Start programs were 
implemented and promoted by governments and 
communities as a multi-prong strategy to support 
children and parents, and combat child poverty. In 
Canada, starting with the national objective of 
reducing child poverty, federal, provincial and 
territorial governments reached a consensus and 
introduced the National Child Benefit (NCB) in 1999. 
The package included income supplement, services, 
and tax credits and subsidies for low income families 
with dependent children. By providing child care tax 
subsidies and income supplement to working parents, 
the NCB sought to achieve the dual objectives of 
supporting child care and incentivizing parents to 
work by “making work pay”.  
In province such as Quebec, the NCB was also 
accompanied with the expansion of public child care. 
In Quebec, the provincial government’s total 
expenditure on child care (including the refundable 
child care tax credit and direct subsidies to child care 
services) rose from $384 million in 1995 to $1,496 
million in 2004. Although critics of Quebec’s $5-a-day 
child care program argue that it was inadequate in 
meeting the real child care needs of the province, this 
is nevertheless as significant step from before, making 
Quebec an clear social policy outlier in comparison 
to other provinces in Canada (Lefebve, 2004). 
Unfortunately, because of the provincial mandate 
over health, education and social welfare, achieving 
an overarching national policy or even a national 
consensus on child care or early child education has 
been historical very difficult in Canada.  The NCB is 
an unusual case, but this was possible mainly because 
it did not attempt to lay ground rule for child care, 
but rather, was a consensus on the financial 
arrangement amongst the federal, provincial and 
territorial governments to reduce child poverty.  In 
2004, the Liberal federal government did manage to 
reach an agreement with the provincial or territorial 
governments to develop a national strategy for child 
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care, but this agreement was cancelled before being 
finalized with the change of the government in 2006. 
Since then the social investment policies have 
remained mainly at the level of public and policy 
debate, while the actual implementations remains 
variably carried out by different provincial 
governments.  
Although Australia shares similar federal government 
system, the ECEC is generally considered the 
responsibility of the Commonwealth (federal) 
government, even though education is primarily the 
responsibility of the state governments. In the case of 
Australia, the federal government has therefore taken 
on a more central role in the child care policy, starting 
with the Child Care Act of 1972 that brought child 
care and education under the Commonwealth 
Minister of Labour and National Services. During the 
1980s, the Labour government considered child care 
largely a part of the social wage. Both the child care 
spaces and public expenditure on child care 
expanded during this period as the government 
expanded its support through fee subsidies to parents 
and direct funding for not-for-profit child care 
providers (Perkins, Nelm, & Smyth, 2004). Like 
Canada, the policy approach to social welfare and 
child care in Australia changed over the 1990s. In an 
attempt to reduce public expenditure, both the 
Labour government under Paul Keating (1993-96) 
and the National Coalition government headed by 
John Howard (1996-2007) successively reformed child 
care policies to “marketize” child care along with 
other government services (Brennan, 2007; Press, 
2000). The Child Care Act was revised in 1991, 
extending child care fee subsidies for parents using 
for-profit as well as not-for-profit care services. Child 
Care Cash Rebate was introduced in 1994 to further 
support working parents. Similarly to Canada, 
Australia also introduced Child Care Benefit in 2000, 
replacing the earlier system of child care assistance, 
and providing increased financial support while 
simultaneously raising the income threshold for 
eligibility and increasing the hours of subsidized care 
for parents with small children. The combination of 
child care subsidies to the for-profit sector and 
increased public support for ECEC led to a huge 
expansion of ECEC market in the 1990s. The total 
number of children using child care increased from 
256,326 in 1991 to 871,107 in 2010 (DEEWR, 2010), 
while the total combined public expenditure on child 
care and pres-school services increased from $2.14 
billion in 1998 to $3.79 billion in 2005 (OECD, 2011).  
In sum, in both Canada and Australia, the social 
investment policies have focused primarily on invest 
in the future with explicit objectives of reducing child 
poverty, incentivizing parental employment, and 
creating positive conditions for child development 
through ECEC. In both countries, much of the social 
investment discourse is framed in terms of protecting 
children, the most vulnerable group in the society, at 
a most critical stage of their development. Through 
tax incentives and tax subsidies for child care, social 
investment policies in both countries aim to reinforce 
parental economic responsibility, and at the same 
time, support human capital investment in children 
through primarily market-based ECEC services.  
 
Japan and South Korea: focus on human capital 
activation and mobilization 
Whereas children are the main target of the social 
investment in Canada and Australia, in Japan and 
South Korea a significant emphasis has been also put 
on the elderly and women. As such, the governments 
of these two East Asian countries have expanded 
public investment in child care, and as well, the care 
of the elderly, and introduced a number of “women 
friendly” workplace policies since the 1990s, all 
of them aimed at promoting healthy ageing, 
incentivizing women and the elderly to participate 
more in the labor market, and to encourage young 
families to have more children. Fundamentally, the 
motivations behind Japan and South Korea’s social 
investment policies are quite different from that of 
Canada and Australia. Rather than driven by the 
concerns of child poverty and income inequality – 
Social Investment Policies in Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea 
49 
which, did in fact became an increasingly more 
evident and wide spread issue after the Millennium 
in Japan and South Korea – the initial imperatives for 
social investment in Japan and South Korea were 
rather concerns over the population ageing and the 
very low fertility rate. For the two countries, the 
medium and long term social and economic 
implications of such demographic shift were obvious: 
increased dependency ratio, ageing of the labour 
force, labour shortage, decline of economic 
productivity and economic growth, and eventual 
population decline. For Japan and South Korea the 
prospect economic growth decline strikes a 
particularly sensitive political chord, not simply 
because, like other advanced capitalist economies, 
economic slowdown implies the weakening of the 
country’s geopolitical position within the world, but 
for these two developmental states in particular it also 
repudiates the very principal role of the state – that of 
guiding the country through economic development. 
Indeed, for both countries, much of the governments’ 
political mandate and legitimacy during the post-war 
era rested on their ability to manage economic growth 
and development. Dealing with long term economic 
decline is therefore an entirely new, and politically 
precarious, proposition for both countries. Active 
social investment was therefore an important strategy 
for these two countries to counter real and potential 
negative economic fall-outs of the progressive 
population ageing.  
In the case of Japan and South Korea, the use of 
social investment policies has been less of an 
ideational break from its historical policy trajectory as 
compared to Canada and Australia. As Midgley (1995, 
1999) points out, the idea of social investment is 
inherently developmental in that in many countries 
social development was simply promoted in 
conjunction with overall economic development. 
In East Asia, both Japan and South Korea have 
been widely recognized as successful cases of 
developmental states that managed to achieve rapid 
economic growth with relative equity in the post-war 
era, and their success have been credited to these 
state’s role in leading and coordinating industrial 
policy and social investment in human capital (World 
Bank, 1993; Peng & Wong, 2008; Holliday, 2000). For 
both countries, social investments in health and 
education are not a new development, but rather a 
part of larger economic development strategy. In both 
countries traditionally there have been significant 
public and private investments in child education. 
What is different with the social investment since the 
1990s, however, is the significant emphasis on not just 
child education, but also child care, elderly care, and 
support for women through family policy, policy 
sectors that had hitherto considered outside of the 
public responsibility, a private family responsibility.  
In Japan, child care expansion has resulted in the 
increase in the total the total number of children 
enrolled in licensed child care centers from 1.8 million 
to 2.02 million between 1990 and 2008, at a time when 
the total number of children under the age of 6 were 
steadily declining. Indeed, the total social expenditure 
on children and family more than doubled from ¥1.6 
trillion in 1990 to ¥3.6 trillion in 2007. Similarly, with 
the implementation of the universal Long-term Care 
Insurance in 2000, the number of long-term care 
recipients in Japan also increased from 1.49 million in 
2000 to 3.29 million in 2005, while its expenditures 
increased from ¥3.25 trillion to ¥6.3 trillion between 
2000 and 2007 (NIPSSR, 2008). In addition, new 
employment legislation reforms have expanded 
government support and strengthened legal 
protection for working parents (women). Fully paid 
maternity leave (16 weeks) and one-year paid 
parental leave (with income replacement of 40%) 
were introduced in 1996. Employment reforms also 
clearly specify parents’ right to take leaves and 
provides guarantee of employment upon return. 
Employment reforms after 1998 have also ensured 
working parents’ right to flexible hours, care leaves, 
an options to switch to part-time employment.  
In Korea, the social investment in children, the 
elderly and women only began to pick up pace after 
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2003, but here also a significant expansion of child 
care and elder care services can be seen. The total 
number of childcare centres increased from 1,919 in 
1990 to 29,823 in 2007, while the number of children 
enrolled in childcare centres rose from 48,000 to 
1,062,415 (MOGEF, 2007). Korea’s public spending in 
early child education increased from 356 billion Won 
to 886 billion Won between 2002 and 2006, while that 
of child care nearly quintupled, from 435 billion Won 
to 2,038 billion Won. Like Japan, new education 
reform plan in South Korea is also moving towards in 
more closely integrating early childhood education 
and early childcare for children aged 3 to 5. There has 
been a proposal to introduce free pre-school 
education for all 5-year olds. Pointing out that early 
childhood education is “the best educational 
investment” a country can make, the Korean 
government has framed the integration of early 
childhood education and child care as a way to 
reduce families’ financial burdens and to raise 
women’s social and economic participation 
(Presidential Commission on Education Reform, 1997, 
cited in Na & Moon, 2003).  Like Japan, Korea also 
implemented a universal Long-term Care Insurance 
in 2008. In its first year of implementation, a total of 
230,000 elderly people received elder care services 
through the LTCI (5.3 per cent of the population aged 
65+). This number is projected to increase to 320,000 
by 2013 (MOHWFA, 2009). Work-family reconciliation 
policies have also been introduced. The four-month 
paid maternity leave and one-year paid parental 
leave (with 500,000 Won per month subsidy) have 
been implemented since 2000. Since then additional 
changes, including the extension of one-year parental 
leave to up to three years, and 3-day paternity leave, 
have been made to further bolster work-family 
reconciliation.  
Like Canada and Australia, both Japanese and 
South Korean government have emphasized the 
expansion of child care and elderly care services 
through private market. However, unlike the two 
English speaking countries, the “marketization” of 
care services in Japan and South Korea is much more 
regulated as the state continues to maintain 
significant control over the cost of the services and 
certification and licensing of child care and elder care 




The Two Approaches to Social Investment 
 
The comparison of the social investment policies in 
Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea shows that 
while the four countries share similar ideas and 
discourses about social investment, they differ in how 
they approach social investment policy reforms, and 
hence the specific policy tools used to achieve their 
social investment objectives. Indeed, there appears to 
be two distinct approaches to social investment: an 
“invest in the future” approach commonly used in 
Canada and Australia, and a “human capital 
activation and mobilization” approach more 
commonly found in Japan and South Korea. The 
differences in the two approaches to social investment 
stems from the differences in the historical, social, and 
economic contexts of these two pairs of countries. 
Whereas the social investment discourse in Canada 
and Australia emerged from the concerns over 
increased child poverty and income inequality 
resulting from the economic restructuring, the 
changes in family structures, and welfare 
retrenchments of the 1980s and 90s, in Japan and 
South Korea, the primary motivation for social 
investment emerged from concerns over the mid- and 
long-term social and economic outcomes of 
progressive population ageing. As a result, social 
investment policies in Canada and Australia are 
much more targeted to children, particularly children 
at risk. Through child care subsidies to working 
parents and the marketization of child care and early 
child education services the social investment policies 
in these two countries attempt to invest in the human 
capital development of children in early years of 
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development, at the same time encouraging parental 
employment and facilitating the development of 
private market in child care and early education 
services. In Japan and South Korea, the human capital 
activation and mobilization is achieved by the 
expansion of child and elderly care services and 
women friendly family policies. By expanding public 
support for care services and relieving the family, and 
particularly women, of family care burden, the social 
investment policies in the two East Asian countries 
aim to support the human capital development of 
children and healthy ageing for the elderly, and at the 
same time, redeploying women’s human capital from 
unpaid care work within the household to paid 
employment in the labor market.  
The differences in social investment approaches 
found amongst the two pairs of countries also reflect 
their different political economic legacies. As liberal 
regimes, Canada and Australia have historically 
taken a residual approach to social welfare. Issue such 
as child care has always been considered a private 
family responsibility. These countries’ traditionally 
strong reliance on market solutions to individual 
well-being has meant that state provisions for the 
family has been limited to serious cases of market 
failure, often in the form of poverty alleviation. It is 
therefore not a coincidence that the basic motivations 
behind social investment ideas in these countries stem 
from child poverty and growing income inequality 
arising from economic and labour market 
transformations. It is also not surprising then that 
much of the social investment ideas and discourses in 
these countries are also focused on creating 
opportunities for children to succeed in the new 
economy, and on shaping parental responsibilities 
through labour market participation.  
Compared to Canada and Australia, the 
developmental state legacies of Japan and South 
Korea have had a different influence on their social 
investment thinking. While equally future oriented, 
Japanese and South Korean governments have 
historically played a more direct role in shaping and 
coordinating economy and the labour market. As a 
part of economic policies, these countries have also 
made more instrumental use of social policies to 
achieve their economic objectives. The recent social 
investment policies in Japan and Korea are much 
more broad in reach in that they go beyond the 
traditional investment in child education, to investing 
in the redeployment of women’s human capital in the 
labour market. In effect, these two countries have 
been using social investment policies to activate 
economy by reassigning some of the unpaid work 
into the paid market economy in hope that it will not 
only create much needed jobs, but also incentivizing 
young couple to have more children so as to stave off 
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1 In Canada, a single parent family is defined as families 
with at least one dependent child under the age of 18 
headed by one parent. The Australian survey only 
includes families with at least one dependent child 
under the age of 15 headed by one parent. 
